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       John G. Knorr, III 
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       Office of Attorney General 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALARCON, Senior Circuit Judge: 
 
Mark D. Tourscher ("Tourscher") appeals from the district 
court's order of November 25, 1997 dismissing his pro se 
complaint ("first complaint") as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. 
SS 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. He also appeals from the 
August 31, 1998 order dismissing a second pro se 
complaint ("second complaint"). This court consolidated the 
two appeals. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
* Hon. Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
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In his first complaint, Tourscher alleged that he was 
deprived of rights by Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections officials ("Prison Officials") that are guaranteed 
under the Eighth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments 
because they compelled him to work in the prison cafeteria 
while he was a pretrial detainee. In his second complaint, 
he asserted that the Prison Officials deprived him of 
meaningful access to the courts in violation of the Due 
Process Clause by compelling him to work in the prison 
cafeteria while he was preparing his appeal from his second 
state conviction. In addition, Tourscher maintained in each 
complaint that he is entitled to be compensated pursuant 
to the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. S 206(a), for the work he 
was compelled to do in the prison cafeteria. 
 
We conclude that Tourscher was a duly convicted 
prisoner who could be compelled to work in the prison 
cafeteria until the date the Court of Common Pleas regained 
jurisdiction following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 
denial of the Commonwealth's petition for allowance of 
appeal. Accordingly, we affirm in part the dismissal of the 
first complaint. We vacate the dismissal of that portion of 
the first complaint that alleges he was compelled to work in 
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment between September 
4, 1997 and September 18, 1997, and remand with 
instructions. We also hold that the district court did not err 
in dismissing the second complaint because Tourscher has 
failed to show that the work he was required to perform 
after his second conviction denied him meaningful access 
to the courts. Additionally, we reject Tourscher's contention 
that pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners are covered 
by the FLSA minimum wage section for services performed 
in intra-prison work. 
 
I 
 
In 1995, Tourscher was convicted of burglary, criminal 
trespass, recklessly endangering another person, simple 
assault, and terroristic threats in the Court of Common 
Pleas of Lackawana County, Pennsylvania. He was 
sentenced to serve three and one-half years to twenty-two 
years. While his appeal from his first conviction was 
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pending, the Prison Officials ordered Tourscher to work in 
the prison cafeteria or face administrative misconduct 
charges. 
 
On August 23, 1996, the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
vacated his first conviction and remanded the case for a 
new trial. See Commonwealth v. Tourscher, 682 A.2d 1275 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). 
 
The Commonwealth filed a motion for reargument in the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court. The Commonwealth's motion 
was denied on October 21, 1996. The Commonwealth then 
filed a timely petition for allowance of appeal with the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court on November 21, 1996. While 
the petition for allowance of appeal was pending, the Court 
of Common Pleas set bail for Tourscher at $25,000 on 
December 6, 1996. Tourscher remained in custody, 
however, because he was unable to post bail. 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the petition for 
allowance of appeal on August 21, 1997. Tourscher was not 
excused from his work assignment in the prison cafeteria 
until September 18, 1997. 
 
Tourscher filed his first complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1983 on July 27, 1997. He alleged that the Prison 
Officials, in both their individual and official capacities, 
violated his right not to be compelled to work under the 
Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Tourscher also alleged that he should be paid the minimum 
wage for his labor pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C.SS 201- 
209. Tourscher prayed for compensatory damages, punitive 
damages, and declaratory relief. He did not request 
injunctive relief. 
 
Tourscher alleged that "the defendants have been forcing 
the Plaintiff to involuntary servitude, and threatening to 
lock him up in the hole if he did not contie [sic] to labor for 
the state." In documents filed with the district court, 
Tourscher asserted that he was required to work in the 
prison cafeteria, at a wage of 22 cents per hour. He further 
stated that he was paid approximately $15 per month. At a 
wage of 22 cents per hour, Tourscher worked approximately 
69 hours per month or less than 17 hours per week. (22 
cents x 69 hours = $15.18.) 
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In his report dated November 5, 1997, the magistrate 
judge recommended that the district court consider either 
dismissing the complaint for failing to state facts showing 
a federal constitutional violation, or on the basis that the 
Prison Officials are immune because the law regarding 
whether a pretrial detainee can be compelled to work in a 
prison cafeteria was "not so clearly established that 
defendants could be considered to know that their conduct 
is unlawful." On November 25, 1997, the district court 
adopted the report and recommendation of the magistrate 
judge as its opinion and dismissed the complaint pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B), without indicating whether it 
believed Tourscher had failed to state a claim, or that the 
Prison Officials were immune. 
 
Following the denial of the Commonwealth's petition for 
allowance of appeal, Tourscher was retried for the same 
offenses. On March 13, 1998, he was found guilty of 
criminal trespass and sentenced to eleven and one-half 
months to ten years. 
 
Tourscher filed his second complaint against the Prison 
Officials on July 27, 1998. In the second complaint, 
Tourscher alleged that the Prison Officials had deprived 
him of his rights under the Eighth, Thirteenth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments. His complaint also alleged, inter 
alia, that the requirement that he perform intra-prison 
work assignments interfered with his ability to prepare the 
appeal from his second criminal conviction. He also claimed 
that he was entitled to be paid minimum wages under the 
FLSA for the work he performed in the prison cafeteria. 
Tourscher prayed for compensatory damages, punitive 
damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief in his 
second complaint. Tourscher failed to allege the number of 
hours he was required to work during the pendency of his 
March 13, 1998 state court conviction and his in forma 
pauperis application did not set forth his monthly income. 
 
The second complaint was also referred to a magistrate 
judge for a report and recommendation. The magistrate 
judge issued a recommendation that the complaint be 
dismissed for "failure to state a claim," pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1915(e)(2)(B), "rely[ing] on the Report and 
Recommendation" filed regarding the disposition of the first 
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complaint. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's 
report and recommendation as its opinion and dismissed 
the action on August 31, 1998. 
 
We have jurisdiction over these consolidated appeals 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Our review of the dismissal 
of each action is plenary. See Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83, 
85 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Jenkins v. Morton, 148 F.3d 257, 
258 (3d Cir. 1998). "[W]e must accept as true the factual 
allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences 
that can be drawn therefrom." Nami v. Fauver , 82 F.3d 63, 
65 (3d Cir. 1996). We may affirm the district court on any 
ground supported by the record. See Central Penn. 
Teamsters Fund v. McCormick Dray Line, Inc., 85 F.3d 
1098, 1107 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Erickson v. United 
States, 976 F.2d 1299, 1300-01 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming 
district court's judgment on the basis of qualified immunity 
without deciding whether plaintiff had established a 
constitutional violation, where district court had reached 
constitutional issue). 
 
II 
 
Tourscher asserts that it is a violation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude to 
require a party not duly convicted of a crime to work in a 
prison cafeteria.1 This court has not previously considered 
the question whether the Thirteenth Amendment precludes 
prison authorities from compelling a prisoner to work 
during the pendency of his or her appeal from a conviction. 
Other circuits, however, have held that a person sentenced 
to serve a term of imprisonment can be required to work 
during the time his or her appeal is pending before a 
reviewing court. See Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d 314, 315 
(9th Cir. 1963) ("There is no federally protected right of a 
state prisoner not to work while imprisoned after 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment provides as follows: 
 
       Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment 
       for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall 
       exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
       jurisdiction. 
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conviction, even though that conviction is being appealed."). 
See also Plaisance v. Phelps, 845 F.2d 107, 108 (5th Cir. 
1988) ("The fact that appellant is appealing does not require 
the district court to assume that his conviction was other 
than duly obtained."); Omasta v. Wainwright, 696 F.2d 
1304, 1305 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that "where a prisoner 
is incarcerated pursuant to a presumptively valid judgment 
. . . the thirteenth amendment's prohibition against 
involuntary servitude is not implicated. . . . even though the 
conviction may be subsequently reversed."). We agree with 
our sister circuits that a duly convicted prisoner continues 
in that status until his or her appeal becomes final even if 
it results in a reversal of the conviction. 
 
Tourscher contends that he ceased being a duly 
convicted prisoner after the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
reversed his original conviction on August 23, 1996. He 
maintains that he reverted to the status of a pretrial 
detainee on that date and could not be compelled to work 
during the pendency of the Commonwealth's attempts to 
overturn the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision. To 
support this contention, Tourscher points out that on 
December 5, 1996, the Court of Common Pleas granted his 
motion to post bail pending his retrial. The Prison Officials 
maintain that the judgment of the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court did not become effective until the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court's denial of the Commonwealth's petition for 
allowance of appeal became final on September 4, 1997. To 
resolve this dispute, we must decide when the judgment of 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversing Tourscher's 
original conviction became effective and restored Tourscher 
to the status of a pretrial detainee. 
 
The parties have not cited any authority to us that 
defines "duly convicted," as that term is used in the 
Thirteenth Amendment. We are persuaded that, in 
determining whether a person incarcerated under state law 
is a "duly convicted" prisoner, we must examine the state's 
laws regarding the effective date of the judgments of its 
courts. Under Rule 1736(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, the taking of an appeal acts as an 
automatic supersedeas.2 In Elizabeth Forward School 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Rule 1736(b) reads in relevant part: 
 
       Supersedeas automatic. Unless otherwise ordered pursuant to this 
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District of Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 149 Pa. 
Commw. 235, 613 A.2d 68 (1992), the court noted that the 
term "appeal," as used in Rule 1736(b), includes petitions 
"under any other provision of law." 149 Pa. Commw. at 
240, 613 A.2d at 70. The court held in Elizabeth that a 
petition for the allowance of an appeal filed by the 
Commonwealth acted as an automatic supersedeas.3 See id. 
A later case, relying on Elizabeth, reached the same result. 
See Public Advocate v. Philadelphia Gas Commission , 177 
Pa. Commw. 41, 45, 646 A.2d 19, 21 (1994). Although, as 
Tourscher argues, Elizabeth and Public Advocate concern 
civil matters, Rule 1764 of the Pennsylvania Rules of 
Appellate Procedure provides that Rule 1736(b) applies to 
criminal matters not involving capital punishment.4 Thus, 
under Pennsylvania law, the filing of a petition for 
allowance of appeal by the Commonwealth stayed the 
effective date of the judgment of the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court. The Commonwealth's petition for allowance of 
appeal was not acted upon by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court until August 21, 1997. Pursuant to Rule 2572(b)(2) of 
the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, "the time for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       chapter the taking of an appeal by any party specified in 
       Subdivision (a) [including the Commonwealth or any officer thereof, 
       acting in his official capacity] of this rule shall operate as a 
       supersedeas in favor of such party. 
 
3. Although not defined in the Pennsylvania Rules, the term 
"supersedeas" is defined as follows in Black's Law Dictionary: "In modern 
times the term is often used synonymously with a"stay of proceedings," 
and is employed to designate the effect of an act or proceeding which of 
itself suspends the enforcement of a judgment." Black's Law Dictionary 
1437 -38 (6th ed. 1990). 
 
4. The full text of Rule 1764 reads: 
 
       Other Stays in Criminal Matters 
 
       Except as otherwise prescribed by the Pennsylvania Rules of 
       Criminal Procedure, Rule 1731 (automatic supersedeas of orders 
       for the payment of money) et seq. shall be applicable to criminal 
       or quasi-criminal matters or orders relating thereto which are not 
       within the scope of Rule 1761 (capital cases) through Rule 1763 
       (vacation of supersedeas on affirmance of conviction). Pa. R.A.P. 
       1764. 
 
                                8 
  
the remand of Record" from an order of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court is 14 days. Under this rule the record 
should have been remanded on or before September 4, 
1997. Accordingly, on that date he reverted to the status of 
a pretrial detainee. 
 
Tourscher, in his opening brief, "concedes that the 
Commonwealth's attempt to appeal the Superior Court's 
order may have kept that order from becoming final." 
Appellant's Opening Brief at 18. He argues, however, that 
"technical notions of finality must bow to the United States 
Constitution . . . ." Id. Tourscher fails, however, to cite any 
authority to support the proposition that the Thirteenth 
Amendment requires us to hold that the decision of an 
intermediate court reversing a conviction takes immediate 
effect, notwithstanding the fact that the judgment is not 
final under state law until its highest court has acted upon 
a prosecutor's petition for review of an intermediate court's 
adverse judgment. Tourscher was a duly convicted prisoner 
until the automatic stay of the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court's judgment expired on September 4, 1977. The 
requirement that he work in the prison cafeteria prior to 
September 4, 1997 did not violate the Thirteenth 
Amendment. 
 
III 
 
It appears that Tourscher's status was equivalent to that 
of a pretrial detainee in the period between September 4, 
1997 and September 18, 1997. This does not necessarily 
mean that Tourscher could not be compelled to perform 
some service in the prison. In Hause v. Vaught, 993 F.2d 
1079 (4th Cir. 1993), and Bijeol v. Nelson, 579 F.2d 423 
(7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam), the courts held that pretrial 
detainees may be required to perform "general 
housekeeping responsibilities" consistently with the Due 
Process Clause. 
 
Because the District Court dismissed Tourscher's 
complaint before filing and service, the nature of the 
services that Tourscher was required to perform during that 
period and the amount of time they took is not on record. 
Such information is necessary before a court can determine 
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whether the prison officials deprived him of this Thirteenth 
Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude or 
his rights under the Due Process Clause. Indeed, the 
defendants have not even had the opportunity tofile an 
answer. 
 
Therefore, we must vacate the dismissal of that portion of 
the complaint that alleges that Tourscher was compelled to 
work between September 4, 1997 and September 18, 1997. 
We will remand with instructions that the District Court 
direct that Tourscher's complaint be filed and let the case 
proceed thereafter. 
 
IV 
 
In his second complaint, Tourscher alleged that the 
Prison Officials deprived him of his right to meaningful 
access to the Pennsylvania courts by compelling him to 
work in the prison cafeteria while his appeal from his 
second conviction was pending in state court. In Lewis v. 
Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), the Court held that the Due 
Process Clause prohibits prison officials from denying a 
prisoner meaningful access to the courts. See id. at 350-55. 
 
Tourscher failed to allege any facts that demonstrate that 
the number of hours he was required to work denied him 
sufficient time to prepare an appeal to the Pennsylvania 
courts from his second criminal conviction. To state a 
viable claim of the denial of meaningful access to the 
courts, Tourscher was required to plead facts 
demonstrating that the work he performed in the prison 
cafeteria interfered with his ability to prosecute his appeal. 
See id. at 351 (an inmate must demonstrate actual injury, 
i.e., that state actors hindered his efforts to pursue a legal 
claim.) Accordingly, we must reject Tourscher's due process 
claim. 
 
V 
 
Tourscher asserts that each of his complaints alleged 
valid claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 
SS 201-209. He argues that pretrial detainees and convicted 
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prisoners must be paid the minimum wage pursuant to 
S 206 of the FLSA.5 
 
The minimum wage provisions of the FLSA, however, 
apply only to workers who are "employees" within the 
meaning of the Act. See 29 U.S.C. S 206(a).6 This term must 
be interpreted in light of the "economic reality" of the 
relationship between the parties. Goldberg v. Whitaker 
House Co-op., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961). 
 
Each circuit that has addressed the question has 
concluded that prisoners producing goods and services 
used by the prison should not be considered employees 
under the FLSA. See Gambetta v. Prison Rehabilitative 
Industries, 112 F.3d 1119, 1124-25 (11th Cir. 1997); 
Danneskjold v. Hausrath, 82 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1996); 
Reimonenq v. Foti, 72 F.3d 472, 475 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996); 
Henthorn v. Department of Navy, 29 F.3d 682, 684-87 
(D.C.Cir. 1994); McMaster v. Minnesota, 30 F.3d 976, 980 
(8th Cir. 1994); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1392-98 
(9th Cir. 1993) (en banc); Franks v. Oklahoma State Indus., 
7 F.3d 971, 972 (10th Cir. 1993); Harker v. State Use 
Indus., 990 F.2d 131, 133 (4th Cir. 1993); Miller v. Dukakis, 
961 F.2d 7, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1992); Vanskike v. Peters, 974 
F.2d 806, 809-10 (7th Cir. 1992); but cf. Watson v. Graves, 
909 F.2d 1549, 1554-55 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding the FLSA 
applicable where the prisoners worked for an outside 
construction company in competition with other private 
employers and where this competition tended to undermine 
compliance with the FLSA). 
 
In Danneskjold, the Second Circuit reasoned as follows: 
 
       The relationship is not one of employment; prisoners 
       are taken out of the national economy; prison work is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The minimum wage for the period specified in Tourscher's complaints 
ranged from $4.25 per hour to $5.15 per hour. See 29 U.S.C. S 206(a)(1). 
 
6. Section 206(a) reads in relevant part: 
 
       Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any 
       workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for 
       commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or 
       in the production of goods for commerce, wages at the following 
       rates . . . . (emphasis added). 
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       often designed to train and rehabilitate; prisoners' 
       living standards are determined by what the prison 
       provides; and most such labor does not compete with 
       private employers. . . . 
 
       As a result, no Court of Appeals has ever questioned 
       the power of a correctional institution to compel 
       inmates to perform services for the institution without 
       paying the minimum wage. Prisoners may thus be 
       ordered to cook, staff the library, perform janitorial 
       services, work in the laundry, or carry ou[t] numerous 
       other tasks that serve various institutional missions of 
       the prison, such as recreation, care and maintenance 
       of the facility, or rehabilitation. Such work occupies 
       prisoners' time that might otherwise be filled by 
       mischief; it trains prisoners in the discipline and skills 
       of work; and it is a method of seeing that prisoners 
       bear a cost of their incarceration. 
 
82 F.3d at 42-43. 
 
We agree with our sister circuits that prisoners who 
perform intra-prison work are not entitled to minimum 
wages under the FLSA. 
 
Tourscher also claims that the minimum wage provision 
of the FLSA should apply to the work he performed while 
he was a pretrial detainee. The only circuit which has 
examined this question held that the FLSA is inapplicable 
to pretrial detainees working for prison authorities since, 
like prisoners, they are not employees under the FLSA. See 
Villareal v. Woodham, 113 F.3d 202, 206-07 (11th Cir. 
1997). 
 
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned as follows: 
 
       Focusing on the economic reality of the situation in its 
       entirety, we conclude that [a pretrial detainee] is not an 
       "employee" under the FLSA. The purpose of the FLSA 
       is to protect the standard of living and general well- 
       being of the American worker. Because the correctional 
       facility meets Villarreal's needs, his "standard of living" 
       is protected. In sum, "the more indicia of traditional, 
       free-market employment the relationship between the 
       prisoner and his putative `employer' bears, the more 
 
                                12 
  
       likely it is that the FLSA will govern the employment 
       relationship." Villarreal's situation does not bear any 
       indicia of traditional free-market employment 
       contemplated under the FLSA. Accordingly, we hold 
       that Villarreal and other pretrial detainees in similar 
       circumstances are not entitled to the protection of the 
       FLSA minimum wage requirement. 
 
Id. at 207 (citations omitted). 
 
We agree with this rationale. Tourscher's employment 
bears no indicia of traditional free-market employment. 
Therefore, we hold that the minimum wage requirements of 
the FLSA do not apply to Tourscher or other similarly 
situated pretrial detainees. 
 
VI 
 
After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we 
conclude that Tourscher's remaining contentions are devoid 
of merit. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We affirm the dismissal of that portion of thefirst 
complaint that alleges that Tourscher was not a duly 
convicted prisoner after the reversal of his state conviction 
by the Pennsylvania Superior Court. We hold that 
Tourscher was a duly convicted prisoner until the 
automatic stay on the Pennsylvania Superior Court's 
judgment expired on September 4, 1998, the date the Court 
of Common Pleas regained jurisdiction following the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's denial of the 
Commonwealth's petition for allowance of appeal. We vacate 
the dismissal of that portion of the complaint that alleges 
that the Prison Officials deprived him of his right as a 
pretrial detainee not to be subjected to involuntary 
servitude between September 4, 1997 and September 18, 
1997, with instructions that the district court direct the 
clerk to file Tourscher's complaint and order that it be 
served on the defendants, and, following appropriate 
pretrial proceedings, make a determination concerning the 
matter of the services Tourscher performed and the number 
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of hours he was compelled to work during that period. We 
affirm the dismissal of Tourscher's second complaint 
because he failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate 
that he was denied access to the courts. Finally, we hold 
that he is not entitled to be paid the minimum wage under 
the FLSA for work he performed as a pretrial detainee or as 
a duly convicted prisoner. 
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